Chief Justice Earl Warren, concluded that the formulation of uniform rules of evidence for the federal courts was both proper and desirable, a conclusion almost unanimously endorsed by the profession. The actual formulation of the Rules was begun in 1965 by a distinguished Advisory Committee and Reporter.
1 4 Contributions from the profession were both solicited and studied. 1 5 As finally promulgated by the Court, the Rules are well conceived and structured, neither radical nor conservative, and thoroughly professional. This is not a blessing of perfection. Every lawyer who ever appeared in court probably feels in his heart that he could "improve" the Rules, and so do we. But the profession cannot wait upon "perfection. Rules of evidence are clearly within the Supreme Court's rulemaking power. They are procedural, for they govern the presentation of facts to court or jury, enabling the trier to apply relevant principles dicial conferences, to have discussions in depth of the proposed rules, and to report to the Advisory Committee. That committee, in turn, examined in great detail and at length, hour after hour, day after day, week after week . . . the wealth of material that came to it from the bench and bar. Testimony of Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Hearings on H.R. 5463, supra note 11, at 22.
14. The members of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence (the "Advisory Committee") were:
Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Esq., Chicago, Chairman; Judge Simon E. 15. The drafts were the product of searching discussion at the various Circuit Judicial Conferences and seminars, of commentary in professional journals, and of circulation among the profession. In light of comments received from the bench and bar, the preliminary draft of March 1969, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969) , was reconsidered by the Evidence Committee in August 1970. Following its revision by the Committee, the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure made a few changes in the Evidence Committee's August 1970 Draft, which, as thus revised, was approved by the Judicial Conference in October 1970. After being submitted to the Court, this draft was captioned, published and circulated as the Revised Draft of March 1971, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971) . In 1971 the Court returned the Draft for further consideration. In view of professional comment, the Draft was again revised by the Evidence Committee, further revised by the Standing Committee, approved by the Judicial Conference in October 1971, and again submitted to the Court. While this Draft was before the Court, the Standing Committee considered and adopted amendments to two rules and, following Judicial Conference approval in March 1972, these proposed amendments were also submitted to the Court. On November 20, 1972 of substantive law on the basis of the facts adduced . 7 That many rules of evidence are important and have a substantial effect in reaching an adjudication' s does not take them outside rulemaking. Rulemaking is not confined to the picayune. The Supreme Court decided this, and decided it correctly, years ago in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.' 9 Until recent congressional action, judicial rulemaking had been generally regarded as the right way to deal with the subject matter of evidence. It is still the right way. Congress should recognize as much and refrain from future intervention in the rulemaking process.
We now proceed to analyze and compare the versions of the Rules proposed by Congress and the Court.
A Critique of Congressional Amendments to the Court Rules
In general, the Federal Rules of Evidence should be interpreted with reference to the standard of construction and statement of purpose in Rule 102:
17. Procedure is an elusive word. Nevertheless, a core of meaning can be discovered from the various instances and purposes for which the word is used: It has been said that procedure "denotes the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished from the law which gives or defines the right, and which by means of the proceeding the court is to administer the machinery as distinguished from its product. Although the evidence rules in general may be considered procedural and thus within the rulemaking power, challenges to some rules in cases involving nonfederal issues have been made under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) . See the discussion of such challenges with respect to rules of competency, at pp. 28-29 infra, and with respect to rules of privilege, at pp. 21-27 infra.
18. See, e.g., the discussion of privileges and Erie at pp. 21-27 infra. 19. 312 U.S. 1, 13 (1941) . For further discussion of this case, see pp. 23-24 infra.
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
The third element-"promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence"-deserves comment. This furnishes the necessary lubricant of growth without undermining the desirable objective of uniformity in the rules of evidence, or giving the judges applying the evidence rules too much personal, ad hoc power. Fears to the contrary are unjustified. First, all the elements emphasized in Rule 102 are subject to the end result that "the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Second, the thrust of Evidence Rule 102 does not differ materially from that of Civil Rule 1 and Criminal Rule 2, which have neither destroyed uniformity nor encouraged abuse of judges' personal power. 20 Third, the Rules of Evidence, as a whole, are neither revolutionary nor novel and will be applied by a bench and bar whose professional training in this area tends toward caution and moderation. The House has amended the Court's Rules of Evidence in ways that undermine the sound principles expressed in Rule 102. A discussion of these amendments follows.
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A. Rule 105-Summing Up and Comment by Judge
As promulgated by the Supreme Court, Rule 105 allows the judge to sum up and comment on the evidence to the jury. 22 This follows 20. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 states:
These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. FED. R. CRnIM. P. 2 states:
These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay. The objectives and principles of construction should be read in conjunction with doctrines of harmless error and plain error; cf. 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
Court Rule 105 reads:
After the close of the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the judge may fairly and impartially sum up the evidence and comment to the jury upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, if he also instructs the jury that they are to determine for themselves the weight of the evidence and the credit to be given to the witnesses and that they are not bound by the judge's summation or comment. both standard federal practice and the common law as embodied in the Seventh Amendment. 23 The House entirely deleted this rule in deference to state law to the contrary, though it recognized federal practice supported such a rule. 24 This omission not only goes against the grain of well-established common law and federal practice, 25 but also inhibits the proper functioning of the jury. 26 Juries need help. Most jurors have no courtroom experience and little familiarity with the language of the law. Often the cases are complicated, confronting jurors with masses of evidence and difficult, abstract concepts molded by necessarily partial counsel. In these cases, the issues may be complicated and convoluted beyond even a lawyer's clarifying ability. A judge must be free to aid the jury in sorting out what it hears and in applying abstract principles of law to the relevant facts adduced at trial.
Admittedly, the judge's summation and comment may be unfair because of bias or honest mistake, and this possibility must be weighed against the need for a judge's clarification of the relationship between the law and the facts. [T]he judge, in submitting a case to the jury, may, at his discretion, whenever he thinks it necessary to assist them in arriving at a just conclusion, comment upon the evidence, call their attention to parts of it which he thinks important, and express his opinion upon the facts; and the expression of such an opinion, when no rule of law is incorrectly stated, and all matters of fact are ultimately submitted to the determination of the jury, cannot be reviewed on writ of error. 407, 409, 412, 414, 415 (1905) . Of course, the strictness with which a judge will apply many of the rules will depend on whether the case is tried to the court or to a jury. if he feels that there is unfairness or error, and this provides at least some safeguard against such prejudice. Further, the Rule provides a standard for the summation and comment: It must proceed "fairly and impartially." Additionally, and perhaps most important of all, general rules of procedure must proceed upon the basis that the judges who will apply them are fair and impartial, an assumption eminently justified by the federal judiciary. Though prior federal practice might continue unchanged even with Rule 105 deleted, the benefits of judicial summation and comment would be far better preserved were the Rule reinstated.
2 7
B. Rule 201-Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts
Rule 201 allows judicial notice to be taken of adjudicative factsthose which have a tendency to prove or disprove some material element in the case. 2 8 The only controverted element of the Rule is section (g), for which the Court provides:
Instructing jury. The judge shall instruct the jury to accept as established any facts judicially noticed.
The House amended Rule 201(g) to distinguish between civil and criminal cases, even though a similar distinction had been made in the Preliminary Draft of 1969 but deleted in a subsequent revision. 29 The House version reads:
Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. We find this unwise.
The American Law
Actual application of the House version would make fools of the judge, the law and the jury. If, for example, the facts warrant a finding that a woman was taken by the defendant for immoral purposes from Newark, New Jersey, to New York City, New York, the judge under the Court Rule would by a proper instruction leave the issue to the jury, while further instructing them that such a journey would constitute a crossing of state lines. The House rule, intended to preserve the power of the jury, would require him to instruct the jury that it "may, but is not required to accept" the proposition that to go from Newark to New York is to cross state lines. Under the final Court revision the jury would still have the power to acquit the defendant though the evidence warranted a judgment of convictionbut on the ground of mercy and not under an instruction permitting it to find that Newark is not really in New Jersey but is a New York suburb of "fun city," and that, after all, state lines were not crossed.
Under the House rule, in the morning when the judge tries a civil case the world is round. That afternoon when he tries a criminal case the world is flat.
C. Rule 301-Presumptions in General
The effect of a presumption has long been a matter of scholarly controversy. Under one theory, a presumption vanishes upon the introduction of evidence which would support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact, even though not believed 3°-"like the bats of the law flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts." 3 ' Such an approach was rejected by the Advisory Committee as giving presumptions too little force. 32 Instead, Court Rule 301 adopted Professor Morgan's theory: 33 In all cases not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. The House thought this approach gave presumptions too great an effect 34 and amended Rule 301 to reach a more intermediate position:
See
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with the evidence, and, even though met with contradicting evidence, a presumption is sufficient evidence of the fact presumed, to be considered by the trier of the facts. 35 In this attempt, the House has not only made unclear what was previously clear but also invaded the judicial function.
The amended Rule in its attempt at compromise does not rest on any clear or consistent theory as to the effect of a presumption. More importantly, the amended Rule attempts to turn presumptions into evidence. The wording of the last clause, "even though met with contradicting evidence, a presumption is sufficient proof of the fact presumed, to be considered by the trier of the facts," can only lead to that conclusion.
Presumptions are not evidence 3 " but a way to deal with it-a technique to handle facts. Consequently, the House treatment of presumptions defies common sense. How can one "weigh a rule of law on the one hand against physical objects and personal observations on the other to determine which would more probably establish the existence or nonexistence of a fact"? 37 Significantly, California's experience with a rule of law treating presumptions as evidence was so unsuccessful that the California Evidence Code expressly states "a presumption is not evidence." 38 Further, the House Rule seems to imply that a judge does not have the power to find contrary to the presumed fact although the weight of the contradicting evidence is such as would warrant directing a verdict, because "even though met with contradicting evidence, a presumption is sufficient evidence . . . to be considered by the trier of fact." Such a provision unduly intrudes upon the judicial prerogative and seems clearly counter to United States v. Gainey:
Our Constitution places in the hands of the trial judge the responsibility for safeguarding the integrity of the jury trial, including the right to have a case withheld from the jury when the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction. 39 The House's sally into resolving the problems of presumptions only serves to confuse and stultify. The Rule as promulgated by the Supreme Court should be reinstated to avoid further misunderstanding in a difficult area of law.
D. Rule 408-Compromise and Offers to Compromise
Court Rule 408 states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
The Advisory Committee justified the Rule's evidentiary stance on the grounds that public policy favors compromise and settlement of disputes 40 and, somewhat more dubiously, that such evidence "is irrelevant, since the offer may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of position." Evidence of admissions of liability or opinions given during compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. Evidence of facts disclosed during compromise negotiations, however, is not inadmissible by virtue of having been first disclosed in those negotiations ....
The House Subcommittee note to Rule 40842 states that this change was based largely on testimony from various government agencies suggesting among other things that the Court rule would lead to greater expense in preparing for trial. 43 Yet the House rule regresses to the obscure technicalities of the common law, 44 which allowed evidence of factual admissions to be introduced unless such admissions were made hypothetically or without prejudice. 45 The affirmative part of this factual admission rule hampered discussion between the parties, while the "unless" qualification provided an undue advantage to the sophisticated and a snare for the unwary. This rule, in essence now adopted by the House, is unjust. As a matter of elementary fairness, what people say in the course of settlement discussions should not be used against them. As a matter of policy, the rule should favor the free exchange of ideas, 46 for this is best calculated to settle problems without the necessity for costly judicial intervention. The Court Rule would better promote these goals, and therefore should be reinstated.
E. Article V-Privileges
The basic premise of the Advisory Committee in drafting Article V was that justice in the federal courts would be enhanced by reducing the number and scope of privileges. Accordingly, although the Committee broadened some of the rules set forth in its Preliminary Draft to meet demands for more protective privileges, 4 7 the Article provides privileges only where most strongly justified by logic and experience: for the lawyer-client, 48 psychotherapist-patient, 49 husbandwife relationships, 5 " for communications to clergymen, 51 for political votes, 52 for trade secrets, 58 for required reports, 5 4 for secrets of state, 5 5 and for informers.5 6 Privileges such as the general doctor-patient privilege and the privilege for accountants have been eliminated because of their unwarranted limitations on truth seeking. As Chief Justice Burger recently observed:
Whatever their [the privileges'] origin, these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth. 57 This approach is also in line with the position of Wigmore and McCormick. 58 While hardly revolutionary, Article V as promulgated by the Court sets forth a more sensible approach to privileges than is found in the evidence law of many states. It rejects the unfortunate tendency toward the proliferation of privileges as professional status symbols.5 9 After much testimony and controversy, 6 0 the House rejected the Advisory Committee's approach and amended Article V to provide for one general Rule 501:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in 47 Thus, as to federal issues, the House Rule has adopted a stopgap, incremental, common law development approach, to evidence law. This approach, like that of Criminal Rule 26,61 relies too heavily on the evolution of privileges through case by case decisions. Judged by the experience under Criminal Rule 26,62 federal rules of privilege will emerge slowly. As the Court observed in Michelson v. United States (on a different evidence issue):
[I]t is obvious that a court which can make only infrequent sallies into the field cannot recast the body of case law on this subject in many, many years, even if it were clear what the rules should be ....
[T]o pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice. 63 Ironically, House deferral to future court decisions on federal issues may result in the adoption of most of the Court Rules on privileges. When, for example, a district judge is faced with a complex and confusing question of a privilege for state secrets, he may reasonably turn to the Court draft for guidance. 64 As to nonfederal issues, 6 " the House has constructed its amendment to the Court Rules on principles supposedly underlying Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 66 It supported its position by these contentions: 61. FFD. R. CRIer. P. 26 provides:
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by an act of Congress or by these rules. The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the Courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. (1) Privileges are substantive for Erie purposes and there is no federal interest strong enough to justify departure from state policy; (2) a rule of privilege is outcome-determinative; (3) state policy should not be frustrated by the accident of diversity jurisdiction; (4) a contrary position would encourage forum shopping. 7 This theory of the Erie doctrine is unfortunate.
See generally
It is now beyond question that the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court includes the power to make rules of evidence."" This power includes the power to promulgate rules of privilege which supplant conflicting state rules of privilege, even in diversity or other cases involving enforcement of state-created rights. 9 Such rules do not violate the principles embodied in Erie or its progeny. 70 Their adoption is both desirable and necessary, in diversity as in other cases, for the efficient and just determination of cases in the federal courts.
Without embarking on a detailed analysis of the meaning of "substance" and "procedure" in the context of the Rules of Evidence, it is clear that rules of privilege are subject to rational classification as procedural. The basic rule of evidence is relevancy. 71 A privilege works to keep relevant and otherwise admissible evidence from the trier of facts. It alters the normal mode of proof in a trial by denying the trier information he would otherwise have before him in determining the facts. What is needed to establish a right and impose liability-a matter of substantive law-is naturally distinguishable from how those substantive requirements may be proved-a matter of procedure. Although a privilege may embody state social policies and may regulate persons' conduct outside of the courtroom, its effect in therefore free to apply their own procedure; see SUBCOMM. 
71.
The provision that all relevant evidence is admissible, with certain exceptions, and that evidence which is not relevant is not admissible is "a presupposition involved in the very conception of a rational system of evidence." A. THAYER A sound precedent for considering privileges as procedural is provided by the promulgation of Civil Rule 35(b)(2). This rule provides that a party physically examined pursuant to a court order, by requesting and obtaining a copy of the report or by taking the deposition of the examiner, waives any privilege regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined him with respect to the same condition. Because plaintiff's lawyer must as a practical matter know what is in the report, the effect of the rule where the examination issue arises in diversity cases is to eliminate the physician-patient privilege despite provision for this privilege in most state codes. 74 a suit based on diversity jurisdiction, plaintiff challenged a district court order that she submit to a physical examination by a court-appointed physician. She argued that the right to be free from physical invasion was too important to be overridden just by a Court Rule and that therefore the Rule authorizing the examination was beyond the scope of the authority conferred upon the Court by the Enabling Act. [B]oth the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that federal courts are to apply state 'substantive law,' and federal 'procedural law,' but from that it need not follow that the tests are identical. For they were designed to control very different sorts of decisions. When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions. ...
[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either. s0 In addition to the reasoning of the Court, Hanna v. Plumer is also important because of the timing of the decision: Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court followed by only a short time his ap- rules of privilege. In Byrd, the Court upheld the federal policy favoring jury hearings for disputed fact questions over contrary state procedural law-regardless of the effect on outcome. 83 As Justice Brennan pointed out, "the federal system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction."
1 4 And he further noted that the federal courts have interests which outweigh the need to follow conflicting state law, quoting Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 0 a leading pre-Erie case. 86 Promulgation and application of rules of procedure and evidence, and, a fortiori, rules of privilege, aid in the just and efficient administration of cases brought into the federal courts 8 7 and embody an important federal interest that should not be altered by deference to conflicting state rules. Privileges, because of their important impact on modes of proof in the federal courts, represent a type of state law which does "interfere with the appropriate performance" of the federal Sound judicial administration requires that judges be assigned temporarily to other districts as special needs arise and as judicial business increases and declines. Different rules of evidence in districts of different states makes such assignment difficult. For the same reason, judges of the courts of appeal, to an even greater extent, find difficulty in reviewing the application of evidence rules in cases coming from districts in different states.
courts' functions, and which should therefore be inapplicable under the reasoning of Byrd. Some commentators have argued that Article V's uniform rules of privilege are probably within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate under Hanna and Byrd, but should not be applied to diversity cases or other cases involving adjudication of state-created rights."" Their view is that comity requires deference to the substantive state policies embodied in privileges, and that failure to apply state privileges in diversity cases or other cases adjudicating state created rights might lead to undesirable forum shopping. 89 We disagree. The obligations of comity cease when state law begins to alter the appropriate functioning of the federal courts. 0 And the use of a dual system of privileges, with state privileges governing proof of state law claims and federal privileges proof of federal claims, would generate unwarranted confusion in the many cases involving both federal and state issues. It is simply not feasible to employ two conflicting systems of privileges in a single trial. 91 And whatever forum shopping might arise from the availability of Article V's privileges is no different from the forum shopping that results from the tactical advantages afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any other aspect of the federal courts or their procedure. 92 House reliance on Erie has its element of irony. It leaves state law privileges applicable in diversity cases but without effect in other federal cases, 93 such as criminal cases. Yet privileges have the greatest impact in criminal cases.
If a privilege is denied in the area of greatest sensitivity, it tends to become illusory as a significant aspect of the relationship out of 88 Nonetheless, the House Rule is temporarily palatable: The amendment at least continues federal control over some cases in federal courts. In the long run, however, the Court Rules of privilege are the most desirable.
F. Rule 601-General Rule of Competency of Witnesses
Court Rule 601 provides:
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules.
It should be read in conjunction with Rule 611(a), which provides that the judge shall exercise discretion over the interrogation of witnesses and the presentation of evidence so as to "(1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."
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Court Rule 601, with its emphasis on admissibility, enables the judge to achieve these goals without being strait-jacketed by medieval rules of incompetency." 6 As Judge Weinstein has pointed out:
The Rules of evidence can do little, by themselves, to prevent conscious distortions by the trier. They should, however, permit all possible relevant evidence and argument to be brought to bear on the trier so that he will at least be forced to bare his soul to himself and to consciously, though silently, justify his actions. 96. At common law, witnesses were deemed incompetent to testify for many reasons -mental incapacity, immaturity, lack of belief in a Divine Being, conviction of certain crimes, relation by marriage to a party. Parties and witnesses having an interest in the outcome of the litigation were also disqualified, as well as the judge and jurors hearing the case. See generally 2 J. WsaasoRE, supra note 27, § § 484-620, at 521-753.
97 As with the amendments to Article V 08 the House was motivated to amend Rule 601 by a desire for partial deference to state law:
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law.
The main effect of the House amendment is to make state Dead Man Acts applicable in the trial of nonfederal matters. 99 This step is regrettable. 0 0
While not technically a part of the common law, the Dead Man Acts are a purely American outgrowth of the long-deceased common law rule that parties and other interested persons are incompetent witnesses. 1 1 0 These statutes have become so entrenched in American jurisprudence as to be found in many jurisdictions. 10 2
No sound policy is protected by this treatment. Commentators agree' 03 that Dead Man statutes merely embody, in the words of Bentham, a "blind and brainless" technique. 0 4 They are unnecessary, for the risk of fabrication on the part of the surviving party can be pointed out by counsel. In a case of fraud, cross-examination will usually "reveal discrepancies inherent in the 'tangled web' of deception."' 0 5 Further, "the survivor's disqualification is [only] more likely to balk the honest than the dishonest survivor. One who would not stick at perjury will hardly hesitate at suborning a third person, who would not be disqualified, to swear to the false story."' ' 00 The original Rule 601 correctly discarded this jurisprudential albatross.
This action should not be undercut by Erie doubts or fears of forum shopping. Rules of competency are essentially legal formulations of credibility. As Professor James has noted, competency disqualifica-98. See pp. 21-22 supra. 99. Note that this will most often differentiate diversity from other cases, and is a regression from FED. R. CIv. p. 43(a), which now governs competency of witnesses and does not distinguish between diversity and other federal cases. The Rule provides that whichever federal or state rule most favors competency shall be followed. Vol. 84: 9, 1974 tions remain very much a part of the trial process in the guise of credibility: "As restrictions on competency have retreated, the old disqualifying items have come in on the question of credibility."' ' 0 7 Credibility is undeniably a matter of procedure. Consequently Erie does not command that state rules on impeachment of a witness's credibility be applied by federal courts in diversity cases. Similarly, state Dead Man Acts should not be controlling. Of course, rules on credibility do affect the outcome of litigation. But the same criticism is true of procedural rules generally and has not been held to mandate the application of Erie principles. 108 In the same vein the elimination of the Dead Man Acts in diversity cases may result in some forum shopping, but forum shopping is inherent in the very notion of diversity jurisdiction. 1 0 9
One other provision regarding witnesses deserves a brief comment. Court Rule 611(b) adopted a "wide-open" provision for cross-examination, 110 but the House returned"' to the so-called federal or restrictive rule."
12 Arguments between proponents of the open and restrictive rules have raged for years."1 3 Inasmuch as experts disagree, and inasmuch as there should be a presumption in favor of the Court. Rules," 4 the Court Rule should be followed. Most important, however, is that the judge have discretion to handle the matter, something guaranteed in both proposals. A witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility. In the interests of justice, the judge may limit cross-examination with respect to matters not testified to on direct examination. 111. The House draft of 611(b) reads: Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of its discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. 114. See p. 38 infra.
G. Article VII-Hearsay
The hearsay rule is designed to ensure that only reliable evidence is presented at trial. Factors to be considered in evaluating testimony are the witness's perception, honesty, memory and narration. 11 The Anglo-American legal system has generally tried to ensure the accuracy of testimony by requiring (1) an oath, (2) the witness's personal presence at the trial, and (3) cross-examination."" Of the three, the lack of cross-examination has been the main justification for the exclusion of hearsay testimony. 11 7 "[C]ross-examination is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth." 118 Yet no one could defend a rule which rejected as worthless all statements untested by cross-examination:
[A]ll historical truth is based on uncross-examined assertions ....
What the Hearsay Rule implies-and with profound verityis that all testimonial assertions ought to be tested by crossexamination, as the best atttainable measure; and it should not be burdened with the pedantic implication that they must be rejected as worthless if the test is unavailable. 1 9 This is especially true when the choice is between evidence which is less than the best and no evidence at all. In considering the desirability of admitting testimony given under imperfect conditions, the Advisory Committee followed the common law approach to hearsay and proposed a general rule excluding hearsay, subject to exceptions. These exceptions are made under circumstances which are thought to guarantee accuracy despite the lack of an oath, personal presence or cross-examination. 120 The exceptions in the Court Rules are not exclusive, for it was recognized that provision for the growth and development of the hearsay rule, as had occurred under the common law, must be incorporated into the Federal Rules of Evidence. (1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony ....
The House added limiting language to provision (A). The amended rule reads in pertinent part: and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath subject to cross-examination, and subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial or hearing or in a deposition .... This amendment almost destroys the usefulness of the provision.
The House was influenced by the traditional and majority rule admitting prior inconsistent out-of-court statements to impeach but not as substantive evidence. 2 2 The exclusion of these statements as substantive evidence is justified by the asserted necessity for the simultaneous satisfaction of oath, observation of demeanor, and crossexamination requirements when the testimony is given. 123 There are several problems with the House Rule. First, it asks the jury essentially to do the impossible by using a statement for impeachment but not for its substantive truth. Mr. Justice Cardozo long ago criticized such rules of law that require "discrimination so subtle" and "beyond the compass of ordinary minds."' 124 The requirement of a contemporaneous oath seems pedantic at best. Commentators have long recognized that the oath is no longer a principal safeguard of the truthworthiness of testimony. 25 Of all the established exceptions to the hearsay rule, only the one for former testimony' 2 6 requires that the out-of-court statement have been made under oath. Further, whatever symbolic value or air of solemnity now is the absence of simultaneous cross-examination.
2 9 Yet this objection seems relatively unimportant in light of the safeguards surrounding admission of prior inconsistent statements. As McCormick has noted:
[T]he witness who has told one story aforetime and another today has opened the gates to all the vistas of truth which the common law practice of cross-examination and re-examination was invented to explore. The two questioners will lay bare the sources of the change of face, in forgetfulness, carelessness, pity, terror, or greed, and thus cast light on which is the true story and which the false. It is hard to escape the view that evidence of a previous inconsistent statement, when declarant is on the stand to explain it if he can, has in high degree the safeguards of examined testimony.
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It is therefore hard to see why the House committee called for "firm additional assurances of the reliability of the prior statement."' 31 These assurances are amply provided for in the Court Rule. Yet the House amendment seeks to double them. This is curious indeed when the hearsay exception for former testimony requires that each of the three criteria be satisfied only once, and no other hearsay exception demands any of them.
Nor does the House version succeed in its goal of avoiding "dispute[s] as to whether the prior statement was made."' 32 The risk of fabrication is present with many of the hearsay exceptions, e.g., those for dying declarations or excited utterances. These exceptions are based on the assumption that they contain sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to minimize the risk of fabrication. Analogously, here, where the witness is before the trier of fact, under oath and subject to cross-examination, the risk of fabrication is diminished. Why prior inconsistent statements should require extraordinary assurances that the statement was indeed made is neither explained by the House nor consistent with the general hearsay exceptions included in Article VIII.
As far as the assurance itself is concerned, it seems to be assumed that it would take the form of a written transcript. But the amendment asks for none, and it is established' 33 that former testimony may be proved by the testimony of any person who was present and heard it given. Moreover, the mere presence of a writing does not eliminate disputes over its accuracy, especially in the case of stenographic transcripts. 3 4 Court Rule 801(l)(d)(A) is eminently more practical than the House Rule. The situations covered by the latter will be few. It is rare that a witness will reject his former testimony given under oath and subject to cross-examination. The Court Rule, however, covers the far more frequent instance of prior statements not subject to the House criteria, and now abandoned on the stand. It provides a more realistic method for dealing with the turncoat witness by making his prior inconsistent statement substantive evidence. 3 5 This principle is consistent with Rule 607's provision that "the credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party calling him." The Court Rule also has the advantage of admitting statements made nearer in time to the relevant events, when memory is fresher.' 3 6
The policies underlying the Court's Rule have met with overwhelming approval from courts, commentators and drafters of other codes of evidence,' 3 7 and the constitutionality of such a Rule was upheld in California v. Green. 38 It should be reinstated. 
Rule 803(6)-Records of Regularly Conducted Activity
Court Rule 803(6) expands the "business records" exception to the hearsay rule. 13 9 The history of the "business records" exception is one of statutory relaxation of rigid common law rules. The Court Rule continues that trend: it broadens the range of records that are admissible to those of "any regularly conducted activity," including those that contain "opinions or diagnoses," and thus expands the exceptions beyond the limits set in such earlier statutes as the Commonwealth Fund Act,' 40 the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 141 and the Uniform Rules of Evidence.' 42 The Court Rule, which is clearly not confined to "business records," was designed to retain the "element of unusual reliability . . . said . . . to be supplied by systematic checking, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation"' 143 without the restrictive connotations implied by the term "business."
The House has frustrated this goal by inclusion of the word "business" in its amendment. The amended rule is titled "Records of Regularly Conducted Activity" yet speaks of records of a "business activity" and expressly defines "business" as including "business, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind." Such drafting is misleading. It uses the term "business" while defining it in a fashion that includes a variety of other forms of endeavor not ordinarily thought of as business.
Furthermore, such terminology puts in doubt the admissibility of many records that provide equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness and have been admitted under the existing "business records" exceptions. 144 Do schools, churches and hospitals fall within the purview of the House Rule? Certainly many individually kept financial records would not.
The deliberate and careful wording of Court Rule 803(6) avoids these definitional problems. It should be restored.
expansive exception to its hearsay rule:
Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the declarant (a) is unavailable as a witness, or (b) is present and subject to crossexamination. aside the sound justifications of the hearsay rule but rather are designed to assure adequate flexibility in its application.
1 5 0 Courts "are loath to reduce the corpus of hearsay rules to a strait-jacketing, hypertechnical body of semantical slogans to be mechanically invoked . ...- 151 Hearsay should be admitted where it is "necessary and trustworthy."' ' 52 The House deleted Court Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(6) because they "injected too much uncertainty into the law."' 15 3 Thus the House bill, while affirming the provision in Rule 102 for "growth and development," would create additional hearsay exceptions only through amendments to the Rules. This position is a step backward from the common law, for it fails to recognize the immediate requirements presented by a live case on trial. Instead, Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(6) are necessary to make the mandate of Rule 102 applicable to the hearsay area. 154 
Conclusion
As the previous account demonstrates, the House changes in the Court's Rules of Evidence are less desirable than the original version. Its revision is a substantial departure from a long tradition of congressional deference to Supreme Court rulemaking. The tradition should be followed.
The Supreme Court has had and exercised rulemaking power since 1792. 155 The modem rulemaking process dates from the early 1930's when the statutory foundations were laid for the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure.' 5 0 Though these and subsequent rulemaking acts' 57 provided for reporting such rules to Congress, 58 and though equity and admiralty rules but did not exercise its statutory authority to make rules in common law cases. This authority was withdrawn by the Conformity Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196, which substituted continuing, in lieu of static, conformity to state procedures in common law cases. Finally, the authority to promulgate "General Orders" bankruptcy practice (without the force of statute) was granted the Court in 1898.
See 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1.03[2.-l], at 153 (2d ed. 1974) .
156. The Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), enabled the Court not only to prescribe rules of procedure for actions at law but also to unite the procedure in equity and at law so as to secure one form of civil action. The Act provided that if the Court should decide to unite law and equity practice the united rules should not take effect until after they had been reported to Congress at the beginning of a session and until after the close of the session.
Under Of course, the Court may postpone the effective date of newly adopted rules beyond the minimum period specified in the statutes, thereby giving Congress additional time to consider them before they become operative. This is the practice which the Court has routinely followed in recent years, as it did in the case of the Rules of Evidence; these rules were issued by the Court on November 20, 1972, but were not to take
